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FAMILY LAW: THE ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF
NECESSARIES AND A WIFE'S AVOIDANCE OF
HER HUSBAND'S DEBTS*
Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. v. Smith,
497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986)
The petitioner filed suit against the respondent-wife seeking payment for unpaid medical bills.1 The respondent's husband had entered
the petitioner hospital and agreed to pay all charges that his insurance
did not cover. 2 Respondent never agreed to be liable for her husband's
unpaid medical expenses.3 After the husband died, however, petitioner
sought recovery from the wife. 4 Petitioner based the claim on the
common law doctrine of necessaries. s The trial court dismissed the
suit after finding that the doctrine of necessaries imposed no liability
on the respondent for her husband's necessaries. 6 The First District
Court of Appeals, certifying conflict with other districts, 7 affirmed the
trial court.8 The Court reasoned that no persuasive authority modified
the doctrine of necessaries. 9 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
and HELD, the common law doctrine of necessaries applies to husbands only. 10

*EditorsNote: This comment received the Huber Hurst Award for the outstanding Case
Comment Spring Semester, 1987.
1. 497 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1986).
2. Id.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
6. 497 So. 2d at 645. In its holding, the trial court rejected precedents from two higher
courts in other districts. Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1980); Parkway General Hosp., Inc. v. Stem, 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981).
7. Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 480 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1985), affd, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986).
8. Id.
9. Id. The District Court of Appeal stated that neither the Florida Constitution, Florida
statutes, nor the Florida Supreme Court had altered the doctrine of necessaries; so, the wife
was not liable for her husband's medical expenses. The court referred to FLA. CONST. art. I
§ 2, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 708.08 (West 1985), Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971). The
court pointed out that these authorities were the same authorities that the Manatee and Parkway
courts had relied on in reaching opposite conclusions. Id.
10. 497 So. 2d at 646.
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Historically, the common law viewed the husband and wife as a
single entity: the husband." As a result, the husband possessed and
controlled the wife's assets, 2 and the wife lost her capacity to contract'8
or to sue or be sued.'1 The husband's control of all the wife's assets
and the wife's loss of legal standing when she married necessitated
his duty to support the wife.' 5 Some states adopted so-called married
women's acts that restored to women the right to control their own
estates.' 6 Despite wives' newfound right to contract for their own
needs, courts maintained the doctrine of necessaries based on the
traditional view that a husband exchanged his support for the wife's
services.' 7 This view prevailed until the United States Supreme Court

11. Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 521, 425 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Md. 1981);
Schilling v. Bedford County Mem. Hosp., Inc., 225 Va. 539, 541, 303 S.E.2d 905, 906 (Va.
1983); Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 140, 299
N.W. 226, 228 (1980); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
(2d ed. 1978); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 859 (4th ed. 1971); Mahoney, Economic
Sharing During Marriage:Equal Protection,Spousal Support and the Doctrine of Necessaries,
22 J. FAm. L. 221, 225 (1983); Johnston, Sex and Property, The Common Law Tradition, The
Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1046
(1972).
12. Condore, 289 Md. at 521, 425 A.2d at 1013; Schilling, 225 Va. at 541, 303 S.E.2d at
906; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 11, at 404; Johnston, supra note 11, at 1045;
Mahoney, supra note 11, at 224.
13. Manatee, 392 So. 2d at 1357; Phillips v. Sanchez, 35 Fla. 187, 190, 17 So. 363, 365
(1895); Stromsted, 97 Wis. 2d at 140, 299 N.W.2d at 228; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 11, at 405; Johnston, supra note 11, at 1046; Mahoney, supra note 11 at 225.
14. 2 F. POLL0ACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 11, at 405; Johnston, supra note 11, at
1046; Mahoney, supra note 11, at 225.
15. Condore, 289 Md. at 516, 425 A.2d at 1013; Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 136, 299 N.W.2d
at 228; Johnston, supra note 11, at 1046; Mahoney, supra note 11, at 225.
16. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1985). See Lee v. Lee, 438 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1983) (married women can hold, control or encumber property without spouse's consent); Holland
v. Holland, 406 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981) (married women entitled to control her
property as if she were unmarried); Smith v. Martin, 186 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1966) (statute validly
entitled wife to separate control of her property). See generally Condore, 289 Md. at 516, 425
A.2d at 1014 (discussing MD. CONST. art. III, § 43 which states that "[tihe property of the wife
shall be protected from the debts of her husband."); Jersey Shore Med. Center v. Estate of
Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980) (married women's property not subject to husband's
debt); Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 136, 299 N.W.2d at 229 (discussing Wis. STAT. § 766.15 which
grants married women property rights and freedom to contract in their own estates).
17. See Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. at 137, 417 A.2d at 1005; Schilling, 225 Va. at 539, 303
S.E.2d at 906; Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 136, 299 N.W.2d at 229; Condore, 289 Md. at 516, 425
A.2d at 1014; Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 513, 314 N.W.2d 326, 332 (1982);
Johnston, supra note 11, at 1066; Krauskopf & Thomas, PartnershipMarriage: The Solution
to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 559 (1974); Mahoney,
upra note 11, at 225-26.

CASE COMMENTS

established "intermediate scrutiny"s as the standard of review for
gender based laws.19 As a result, courts have revisited the doctrine
of necessaries to test its viability in light of this new level of scrutinya °
and other public policy considerations.21
The Florida Supreme Court established the doctrine of necessaries
in Phillips v. Sanchez.2 In Phillips, the respondent performed domestic services for petitioner's household.23 The respondent had contracted

18. Intermediate scrutiny requires that any law which distributes benefits or burdens on
the basis of sex must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. See infra
note 19.
19. Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (social security law giving aid to families when
the husband is unemployed but not when the wife is unemployed is unconstitutional); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (statute holding husbands responsible for alimony without comparable
burden on wife is unconstitutional); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (allowing social
security benefits to widower only if he proves he received half of support from his wife without
a comparable burden on wife is unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (law
prohibiting beer sales to males younger than 21 and females younger than 19 is unconstitutional);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (law making age of majority 21 for men and 18 for women
is unconstitutional); Weinburger v. Wiessenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (social security laws paying
survivor's benefits from deceased husband to wife and children only is unconstitutional); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1972) (regulation requiring wife to prove husband's dependence
to claim armed forces benefits while not requiring the same proof from a husband is unconstitutional); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (state law preferring men over women as administrators
of estates is unconstitutional).
20. See Condore, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981) (abrogating the doctrine based in
part on equal protection considerations); Jersey Shores, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980)
(extending the doctrine to apply equally to hold either spouse liable for the other's necessaries);
Marshfield, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982) (extending the doctrine to hold either
spouse liable for the necessaries of the other, but also holding that making the husband primarily
liable does not offend equal protection); Schilling, 225 Va. 516, 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983)
(abrogating the doctrine based solely on equal protection considerations).
21. See United States v. O'Neil, 478 F.Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (extending the doctrine
to apply equally to either spouse for the other's necessaries based on Pennsylvania's Equal
Rights Amendment); Condore, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981) (abrogating the doctrine
based in part on state's Equal Rights Amendment); Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003
(N.J. 1980) (extending the doctrine to apply equally to either spouse for the other's necessaries
based on gender neutral divorce statutes, married women's Acts, and judicial notice of the
economic equality of women); Manatee Convalescent Center, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1980) (extending the doctrine to apply equally to either spouse based on gender neutral divorce
statutes and judicial notice of the economic equality of women); Marshfield, 105 Wis. 2d 506,
314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982) (extending the doctrine but basing its decision to hold the husband
primarily liable for either spouse's necessaries on statistics revealing that women on the whole
work less and earn less than men); Parkway General, 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981)
(extending the doctrine to apply equally to either spouse for the other's necessaries based on
gender neutral divorce statutes and judicial notice of the reality of modern society).
22. 35 Fla. 187, 17 So. 363 (1895).
23. Id. at 189, 17 So. at 363.
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with the petitioner's wife to perform services and had no dealing with
the petitioner.A After the petitioner died,? the respondent sued
petitioner's estate to recover money owed under the contract. 6 The
petitioner's estate sought to avoid liability arguing that the wife had
no authority to bind the petitioner's assetsY The Court, however,
sustained the judgment for respondent.2 The Court held that the
wife's right to support from her husband entitles her to pledge the
husband's assets to pay for necessary expenses. 9 The Court reasoned
that since the petitioner was disabled, and the wife could not handle
the household duties alone, hiring a housekeeper was necessary; 30 thus,
the petitioner was liable for the expense.31
This rule remained unmodified and in effect throughout Florida
until 1980. In Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald,2 the
Second District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether the
defendant was liable for the medical expenses of her husband under
the doctrine of necessaries.- The appellant had rendered medical services to appellee's husband.- The appellant sought the cost of the
medical services from the appellee.- There was no contract between
the appellee and appellant. There was also no statute requiring the
appellee to pay for her husband's medical debts. The court, therefore,
directly addressed the issue of whether to expand the common law
doctrine of necessaries to wives (i.e. to appellee).36
The court expanded the doctrine to include a wife's duty to supply
her husband's necessaries.3 The court, however, declined to apply the

24. Id. at 190, 17 So. at 364.
25. Id. at 189, 17 So. at 364.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 190, 17 So. at 364.
28. Id. at 189, 17 So. at 364.
29. Id. at 191, 17 So. at 364.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980).
33. Id. at 1356-57.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Court's opinion did not discuss the reasons the appellant sought such recovery.
36. Id. at 1357.
37. Id. at 1358. Accord Parkway General, 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981). See Cooke
v. Adams, 183 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1966) (establishing joint and several liability of spouses for
either's necessaries); Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980) (expanding doctrine to
hold both spouses liable with primary liability on the spouse incurring the necessary debt);
Marshfield, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982) (expanding doctrine to hold both spouses
liable with primary liability on the husband for the necessary debt of either spouse). For
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expanded doctrine to the facts before it8 thereby affirming the trial
court's judgment for the appellee s9 The court justified its decision by
emphasizing the changes in the common law, both in Florida" and
other states, 41 and changes in Florida's statutory laws which acknowledged equality of the sexes."
While the Manatee court extended the doctrine of necessaries to
either spouse, other courts have abrogated the doctrine entirely.4 In
Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hospital,- the Supreme Court
of Virginia addressed the issue of whether the appellant, whose wife
received medical treatment from the hospital, could avoid liability for
his wife's necessities on equal protection grounds."4 Although the wife
had signed promissory notes for the expenses, appellant never cosigned. 46 Appellees then sought to hold the husband liable under the
doctrine of necessaries. 47 The appellant argued that the common law
doctrine was an unconstitutional gender-based classification.4 Appellee
argued that because the Virginia Legislature amended the spousal
support laws to apply gender-neutral burdens of support, 49 the Legisjustifications or criticism of the different approaches these courts adopt, see generally Note,

The New Doctrine of Necessaries in Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 317 (1985); Mahoney, supra
note 11; Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of the Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767 (1984).
38. 392 So. 2d at 1359. The court applied the expanded doctrine prospectively because it
felt the parties had a right to rely on the prior law. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1357. The Court relied upon one case from Florida to support its decision. See
Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971) (granting the wife a cause of action for loss of
consortium and justifying the Court's role in modifying the common law).
41. 392 So. 2d at 1357-58. The Court relied on three non-Florida cases. See United States
v. O'Neill, 478 F.Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Pennsylvania's common law principle of sex-neutral
burden of spousal support applies to make a wife liable for her husband's necessaries); Jersey
Shore, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980) (expanding doctrine to both spouses but primary
liability on spouse who incurred debt); State University Hosp. v. Moyer, 62 Miss. 2d 761, 309
So. 2d 741 (1970) (court refused to expand doctrine but indicated in dicta that it would have
done so had it not been for the wife's financial disability).
42. 392 So. 2d at 1357. The Court specifically relied on FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1979), which
the legislature amended in 1971 to eliminate references to "husband" or "wife" and substitute
sex-neutral terms such as "spouse" or "party."
43. Condore, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981). The Maryland court abrogated the
doctrine because of the state's Equal Rights Amendment, due process considerations, and judicial
notice of the changing role of women. See infra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
44. 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983).
45. Id. at 543, 303 S.E.2d at 906.
46. Id. at 541, 303 S.E. 2d at 906.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.

49. Id. at 542-3, 303 S.E.2d at 907. Appellee relied on two statutes that the General
Assembly amended to make their application equally to husbands and wives. VA. CODE § 20-62
(1975) (criminal non-support statute); VA. CODE § 20-107 (1975) (alimony statute).
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lature had implicitly modified the doctrine of necessaries to apply to
husbands and wives equally.5 Appellee further argued that applying
the burden equally would overcome appellant's equal protection argument. 1 Reversing the trial court,5 the Court agreed with appellant's
equal protection argument. The Court found no legislative history
supporting the appellee's argument that the Virginia Legislature intended to modify the doctrine.6 The Court then decided that by denying equal protection to the husband the unmodified doctrine was unconstitutional. 5
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court refused to modify
the doctrine of necessaries.5 Reversing the Second and Third District
Courts of Appeal, 57 the Court reviewed its role vis-A-vis the legislature
in affirming the trial and appellate courts' decisions.5 The Court discussed the doctrine's history59 and acknowledged that holding a husband unilaterally liable for the wife's necessaries is an historic relic
with no validity today. 6° The Court undertook an analysis of its duty
in light of this anachronistic doctrine 61 and found itself in the difficult
position of having to choose between two persuasive arguments.6
Rather than choose, the Court deferred to the legislature.The Court reasoned that it could not establish a fixed rule of law
modifying the doctrine. 64 The Court asserted that certain fact situa-

50.
51.

225 Va. at 542, 303 S.E.2d at 907.
Id. at 543, 303 S.E.2d at 908.

52.
53.
54.

Id. at 544, 303 S.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 543-44, 303 S.E.2d at 907-08.
Id. at 543, 303 S.E.2d at 907.

55. Id. at 544, 303 S.E.2d at 908.
56. 497 So. 2d at 646.
57. Id. (The court reversed Parkway General, 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981);
Manatee Convalescent, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. (1980)).
58. 497 So. 2d at 646.
59. Id. at 645.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 646.

62. Id. The petitioner argued that marriage is a partnership that financially benefits
whenever one spouse receives benefits. To avoid unjust enrichment of the marital partnership,
the court should find an impliel contract for either spouse to pay for the other's necessaries.
Id. See Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980) (applying this view in a separate

property state). But see Mahoney, supra note 11, at 646 (criticism of this argument). In the
instant case, the respondent argued against the marital partnership theory and insisted that
the petitioner had a duty to bind her to a written contract if they planned to look to her assets
for payment. 497 So. 2d at 646.
63.
64.

497 So. 2d at 646.
Id.
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tions may occur where holding either spouse liable for the other's
debts would be inequitable.s Fact situations may just as easily arise
where not holding either spouse liable would be inequitable to creditors.6 The issue in each case of whether to hold a spouse liable for
the other's necessary expenses is one of equity that should be determined from the specific facts of each situation. 67
The Court drew two conclusions from this line of reasoning. First,
modifying the doctrine requires public input.6 Second, the judicial
branch is the least available branch for public input. 9 The Court,
therefore, held that the decision whether to modify the doctrine of
necessaries is a legislative prerogative. 70 Thus, the Court reasoned
that it could not establish a fixed rule modifying the doctrine because
each situation demands factual and equitable determinations. Despite
the need for these fact-specific determinations, the Court felt obliged
to defer to the legislature for a fixed rule modifying the doctrine.
In reaching its holding, the Court reestablished Phillips as the
controlling law of necessaries in Florida overruling Manatee.71 The
Court avoided the equal protection and public policy arguments the
Schilling court and others used to modify the doctrine.72 In Phillips,
the Court had decided to hold the husband liable for his wife's debts.7
The Court based this decision on the husband's duty to support the
wife; 74 if the husband did not provide for support, his wife was allowed
to bind his assets to pay for necessary expenses. 75 In the instant case,
the Court recognized that requiring only the husband to be responsible
for the wife's necessaries without imposing a reciprocal burden on the

65. Id. The Court gave no specific fact situations where holding either spouse liable would
be inequitable. But see generally Mahoney, supra note 11, at 246, (arguing financial situation
of each spouse should be taken into account before allocating the burden of support under the
doctrine of necessaries).
66. 497 So. 2d at 646. See generally Mahoney, supra note 11, at 240-41 (arguing the doctrine
is important in assuring creditors payment for goods and services they extend to needy dependent
spouses).
67. 497 So. 2d at 646. This view is unique because courts in other jurisdictions have opted
for fixed rules. See generally Mahoney, supra note 11, at 240-44 (fact-specific equitable determinations for deciding which spouse should be liable, taking account of both the couple's and
creditor's interests, may be a viable option).
68. 497 So. 2d at 646.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 646-47.
72. Id. See cases cited supra notes 1 & 21.
73. Phillips, 35 Fla. at 191, 17 So. at 364.
74. Id,
75. Id. at 192, 17 So. at 365.
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wife is an anachronism 76Despite this concession and the fact that the

doctrine of necessaries is a judicial common law doctrine from England,- the Court deferred the question of whether to modify the doctrine to the legislature.7s The Court, therefore, allowed this anachronistic doctrine to stand.
While allowing the doctrine of necessaries to remain in effect, the
Court expressly disapproved of Manatee.- The Manatee court considered retention of the doctrine, with the sole burden for support on
the husband, an abdication of its judicial duty 0 The opinion pointed
to Florida's recently enacted gender neutral alimony statute81 as representative of the law's movement toward eliminating distinctions
based on sex.- This movement formed the basis of the Manatee court's
judicial duty to modify the doctrine.- In contrast, the Court in the
instant case felt the proper judicial duty toward an issue filled with
broad questions of public policy was to defer to the legislature. The
Court implicitly rejected Manatee's recognition of the legislature's
87
mandate requiring equal treatment in divorcem and alimony statutes.
Further, the Court agreed with the parties that the law as it stands
is an anachronism but rejected the Manatee decision anyway. However, the Court's deferential approach necessitated overruling Manatee's holding and its notice of modern trends.
In its effort to ensure judicial deference, the Court refused to hear
the petitioner's equal protection argument.8 The Schilling court relied
76. 497 So. 2d at 645.
77. Shands Teaching Hosp. v. Smith, 480 So. 2d 1366, 1367 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 adopting the English common law as the law of Florida), affd, 497 So. 2d
644 (Fla. 1986).
78. 497 So. 2d at 646.
79. Id.
80. Manatee, 392 So. 2d at 1357 (citing Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1971)).
81. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1979).
82. Manatee, 392 So. 2d at 1357.
83. Id.
84. 497 So. 2d at 646. The Court, however, did not expressly state what the "broad public
policy questions" were. Id.
85. Id.
86. FLA. STAT. § 61 (1971).
87.

FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1979).

88. 497 So. 2d at 645-46.
89. 497 So. 2d at 646 n.1. Courts allowing a hospital to raise the husband's equal protection
argument include Condore, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981) (the court did not address
the standing issue, but implicitly allowed the hospital standing to assert the equal protection
and equal rights amendment arguments); Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. 137, 144, 417 A.2d 1003, 1006
(N.J. 1980) (allowing the hospital standing to raise the husband's equal protection argument
based on the hospital's personal stake in the outcome, the hospital's adverseness, and the
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solely on the husband's equal protection argument in allowing him to
avoid liability for his wife's necessaries.- Faced with a sex-based classification that could not withstand the court's intermediate strict
scrutiny test, 91 the court abrogated the doctrine.9 Had the Court in
the instant case heard and accepted the petitioner's equal protection
argument, the Court may have been persuaded to abrogate the doctrine. Instead, the Court failed to reach the constitutional issues because that petitioner lacked standing to assert the husband's equal
protection argument.Y Because the petitioner could not raise the equal
protection arguments, the Court was free to defer the issue to the
legislature.
The Court's deflection of the constitutional issues in the instant
case required the reestablishment of an anachronistic common law
doctrine. The Court revived the doctrine by overruling lower courts9

significant public interest involved). Florida courts generally require the same standing elements
as the United States Supreme Court. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 17 (Fla.
1974) citing with approval Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). The United States Supreme
Court bases its standing requirements on Article III of the U.S. Constitution which allows courts
to adjudicate only actual cases or controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), the Court held that standing requirements
are satisfied when the plaintiff is actually injured and court action is likely to redress that
injury. Id. at 38. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1977), the Court addressed the issue of a
plaintiffs right to raise a third party's equal protection argument. Because the plaintiff suffered
economic injury which a court could redress, the plaintiff satisfied the constitutional standing
requirements. Id. at 193. For a plaintiff to assert another's rights, however, the Court further
required that the plaintiff be in a position to vigorously and competently assert the third party's
equal protection arguments. Id. at 194. The Court expressed a desire to avoid "repetitive and
time consuming litigation" fostered by allowing only third parties to raise their own rights
rather than allowing a plaintiff already suing to raise the rights. Id.
The petitioner in the instant case seems to have fulfilled the requirements necessary to
assert the husband's equal protection arguments. The economic redress petitioner sought.seems
to assure the adversity of the litigation. Nothing in the case indicates the petitioner would fail
to adequately assert the husband's rights. Furthermore, the possibility of "repetitive and time
consuming litigation" is minimal when the third party/husband raises equal protection arguments
against a suit by creditors to recover for the wife's necessary expenses. The Court in the instant
case, however, refrained from analysis of these principles and instead summarily stated that
petitioner lacked standing to assert the husband's equal protection arguments. 497 So. 2d at
646 n.1.
90. Schilling, 225 Va. 539, 542, 303 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Va. 1983). The Court rejected
petitioner's argument that Virginia's gender neutral support statutes required the Court to
extend the doctrine to hold either spouse liable for the necessaries of the other. Id.
91. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
92. Schilling, 225 Va. 539, 543, 303 S.E.2d 905, 908 (Va. 1983).
93. 497 So. 2d at 646 n.1.
94. Id. at 646. See supra note 6 for the overruled decisions.
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that recognized trends in modern law and society towards gender
neutrality.95 The Court also set the stage for its deference to the
legislature by denying the hospital standing to assert the husband's
constitutional challenges.9 Allowing the respondent to escape liability
leads to an anomalous result. The Court permitted the respondent an
inequitable benefit by applying a doctrine that unilaterally burdens
the husband. The doctrine is premised on the wife's inability to contract
for her own needs- thereby necessitating the husband's duty of support.9 Had the doctrine been applied to restrict the respondent's freedom to contract, she assuredly would protest. The Court's failure to
extend the burden to wives allows wives to benefit from a doctrine
whose premises they would energetically oppose. In short, the Court
allowed the respondent to benefit from modem trends without imposing the reciprocal burdens which follow from the same trends. The
Florida legislature should take note of this anomalous result and modify
the doctrine accordingly.
Gary W. Powell
95.
96.
97.
98.

See supra notes 40-42 and text accompanying notes 81-84 (discussions of these trends).
497 So. 2d at 646 n.1.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
See supra text accompanying note 15.

